and have become highly developed while the natural sciences (concerned so largely with material things) remained rudimentary.

Reflection on these truths should suffice to convince the biologist of the baseless nature of the prejudice that only the spatially extended features of the world can be dealt with scientifically and only in terms of mechanistic causation. For this seems to be the main root of this widespread reluctance to resign the hopeless search for mechanistic explanation in biology.

In face of such considerations, some will appeal to the authority of Kant, saying: ' Did not Kant show that our mental constitution compels us to think of all natural events in terms of space, as well as of time and causation ?' To which the answer is : Kant, though he showed that our spatial thinking *may be* wholly the expression of our mental constitution, did not show that we necessarily think of all events as spatial, still less that all our thinking ought to be spatial.

Consider the case of two men engaged in a moral or a legal argument over right and wrong (or, equally well, let the argument be wholly concerned with numbers, be arithmetical or algebraic ; or with music and the beauty of tone combinations; or with theory of probabilities, See.), and especially let them be men of the not rare type who have no power of visualization. How little of spatial factors their thinking may involve. In such cases, if certain propositions are admitted by both parties (and all sane men hold certain moral truths in common), then it is possible for the one party to construct an

argument which may compel the assent of the other ; and the argument may proceed without any need to refer to spatial properties and relations, may move, that is to say, in a non-spatial